INTRODUCTION
The Charter of the United Nations (Charter) aims "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small."' The Charter goes on to state that the United Nations (UN) serves the purpose of "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 2 These pronouncements were further expressed by the UN General Assembly in 1948 through the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 3 "In accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter" and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 4 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 5 on December 16, 1966.
Taiwan implemented into its domestic law the ICCPR and ICESCR (Covenants) on March 31, 2009, through the Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Taiwan Act). 6 Although Taiwan is not a member of the UN and, therefore, cannot formally be a member of the Covenants, Taiwan implemented the Covenant provisions with the ultimate goal of strengthening its human rights protection system. 7 Taiwan highly respects the human rights of its citizens, and demand for this respect is growing. 8 But real human rights problems, such as corruption, discrimination against women, human trafficking, and abuse of foreign migrant workers, still exist in Taiwan and need to be addressed. 9 The implementation of the ICCPR and ICESCR into Taiwan's domestic law has afforded Taiwan a brilliant opportunity and an additional mechanism for holding itself accountable for its human rights issues. 10 Taiwan's human rights situation will likely be strengthened by the fruitful and constructive dialogue among the government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other stakeholders that is encouraged by the Covenants. ' This dialogue can be facilitated in part by the formation of ad hoc committees that provide recommendations for the future development of human rights guarantees. 12 Additionally, the Covenants promote the tweaking of domestic law to conform to Covenant provisions and hearten a passionate effort by States parties and NGOs to report on measures taken to implement their human rights protections. 13 The next four years are crucial for determining Taiwan's level of commitment to the ICCPR and ICESCR.
14 This Note discusses two major themes that have emerged from Taiwan's ratification of the Covenants. The first regards the salient meaning and implications of ratification and non-membership of international treaties along relevant legal information is provided by Taiwan Law Resources. See TAIWAN LAW RESOURCES, www.taiwanlawresources.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
7. Taiwan Act, supra note 6, art. 1. 10. An opportunity for Taiwan's accountability to international human rights norms also occurred with its implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). See infra Part V.A.
See generally
11. See U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Manual on Human Rights Reporting Under Six Major International Human Rights Instruments, at 262, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/9 1/1 (Rev. 1) (1997) [ hereinafter Manual] ("The main function of the Committee is to assist States Parties in fulfilling their obligations under the Covenant, to make available to them the experience the Committee has acquired in its examination of other reports and to discuss with them any issue related to the enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the Covenant in a particular country.").
12. See infra Part VI. 13. Id. 14. This time frame takes into account the time necessary for Taiwan to make its domestic law conform to the Covenants and gives the Government and civil society time to complete one initial reporting cycle. See infra Figures 1, 2. with the judicial adoption and the function of these international instruments. 1 5 This salience derives from the fact that Taiwan is not a member of the UN and, in general, cannot be a member of the Covenants. 16 At the same time, Taiwan has chosen to implement the ICCPR and ICESCR into its domestic law, leaving open the issue of these instruments' legal status in domestic law and courts. 17 The second theme is how and to what extent Taiwan, through both its government and civil society actors, plans to fulfill the duties embodied by the Covenants and ensure its accountability for those obligations. 8 To this end, the discussion in this Note is founded on Articles 5 and 6 of the Taiwan Act as they relate to the Covenants. Article 5 states that " [t] he government should cooperate with other national governments and international non-governmental organizations and human rights institutions to realize promotion and protection of human rights provisions in the two Covenants."' 9 Article 6 states that " [t] he government should set up human rights reports system in accordance with the two Covenants., 20 Specifically, this Note begins with a discussion of the rights embodied in the Covenants and briefly discusses their relation to Taiwan's constitutional and legislative guarantees of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. 2 Further discussion includes the challenges of international human rights law in Taiwan and the judicial adoption and the function of international human rights law from both a monist and a dualist point of view. 22 This Note also discusses the meaning and implications of ratification and non-membership of an international treaty and suggests that Taiwan implement the reporting obligations established by Article 40 of the ICCPR and Article 16 of the ICESCR. 23 Along with an overview of this State reporting process, this Note 26 Since Taiwan is not an official member of the UN, participation in international fora is difficult, but it is not impossible. 27 Taiwan has experience participating with the international community through non-governmental 28 entities as well as ad hoc bodies that have an international nature. This Note takes the point of view that Taiwan will be able to accomplish the tasks of conforming its domestic law to the Covenants while holding itself accountable to the Covenant provisions through ad hoc committees made up of international actors. 29 
A. Background of the Covenants
There exists a variety of human rights, which can be categorized in a myriad of ways. 30 The current trend, however, is to classify human rights as either civil and political rights or economic, social, and cultural rights. 3 Notwithstanding the popular distinction between these human rights categories, the UN has emphasized the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights; 3 3 it has also emphasized that these rights must first be implemented at national and local levels. 3 4
B. ICCPR Rights and Civil and Political Rights Embodied in the Constitution of Taiwan
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (High Commissioner for Human Rights) describes the ICCPR as elaborating "the civil and political rights set out in the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. 35 That Covenant incorporates key civil and political rights and freedoms, 3 6 and it also requires States to report periodically to the Human Rights Committee.
37
Civil and political rights can be found generally throughout the Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Constitution of Taiwan) but specifically in Chapter II, Rights and Duties of the People, 38 and Chapter XIII, Fundamental National Policies. 3 9 Some civil and political rights can also be found in Article 10 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Additional Articles).
40

C. ICESCR Rights and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Embodied in the Constitution of Taiwan
The High Commissioner for Human Rights describes the ICESCR as developing "the corresponding rights in the Universal Declaration [ The ICCPR does not recognize such progressive realization. Relevant social, economic, and cultural rights can be found throughout the Constitution of Taiwan and are further enumerated in Article 10 of the Additional Articles. 46 Article 10 guarantees the promotion of universal health insurance and encourages "research and development of both modem and traditional medicines., 47 It also safeguards the dignity of women by promoting the elimination of sexual discrimination and gender inequality, 48 and it guarantees the allocation of social resources to physically and mentally handicapped persons. 49 In addition, Article 10 emphasizes the need for social welfare services, funding for education, science, and culture. 5° Further, Article 10 recognizes the need to preserve and develop aboriginal cultures, 5 guarantees ethnic cultures' political participation, and provides assistance and encouragement for their education, culture, transportation, water conservation, health and medical care, economic activity, land, and social welfare. Significantly, all Article 10 guarantees are practiced and promoted in Taiwan Although the dominion labels placed on Taiwan have been disputed throughout history, 59 it is of ultimate importance for domestic implementation of international human rights norms that, despite so-called regime changes and portions of history where state institutions have been particularly oppressive, Taiwan has remained largely in charge of its own affairs. 60 As such, years of struggle have yielded a strong democratic government system in Taiwan. 61 Its justice system has independent courts, judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, 6 2 and there is a thriving, well-established, and deeply-rooted legal education system; one with internationally respected scholars and a bar that is strong and ethical. 63 The Constitution of Taiwan guarantees basic human rights and emphasizes rule enforcement represents Taiwan's embracement of the two covenants, which is helpful to Taiwan in its promotion of human rights and in its effort to establish [a] link with the international system. In compliance with the President's instruction, the Ministry of Justice has worked out a plan for enforcing the two covenants.").
54. 
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of law and democracy. 64 It also has a mechanism for constitutional review through the Council of Grand Justices. 65 Taiwan further has a strong consumer protection framework, robust property laws, 66 and laws aimed at preventing domestic violence and maintaining equality among the sexes. 67 In addition, civil dispute resolutions in Taiwan are in keeping with international practice, and
68
there is an arbitration mediation system that is international in character. Taiwanese labor protection laws also are very strong, and the criminal code and code of criminal procedure maintain high standards of human dignity and are transparent and fair. 69 The passing of the Taiwan Act is simply a natural consequence of Taiwan's democratic system, which places a great deal of emphasis on the rights of its citizens. These protections have arisen through domestic legislation, but special situations arise when governments are limited in entering into agreements with other governments but want to strengthen their domestic commitments with international instruments. 7°B .
Judicial Adoption and Function of International Human Rights Law
There exist two very basic theories regarding the relationship between international and domestic law: monism and dualism. 71 The monist view holds that international law and domestic law function as the same legal system, meaning domestic courts may employ international law in making decisions.
72
The dualist view holds that international law and domestic law exist separately; therefore, domestic courts may incorporate or reject international principles at their discretion. 73 [Vol. 22:1 theories. 74 Waters advocates a "narrow lens approach" that focuses on exploring the variety of techniques that enable courts to utilize a particular international source in interpreting domestic law. 75 In areas with a civil law tradition, international instruments, such as human rights treaties, are often "automatically" incorporated into domestic law. 76 The reason for automatic incorporation of these instruments is that there is less of a distinction between international and domestic law, in part because they have the same natural law source. 77 Consequently, when governments from civil law traditions such as Taiwan 78 refer to international treaties, 79 they act perfectly in line with their legal tradition. 80 Giving treaties a higher normative status than that given to ordinary national legislation is not a new phenomenon.
8 ' Indeed, some States have given human rights treaties a normative rank higher than that of other treaties. 82 Regarding monist and dualist viewpoints, Article 2 of the Taiwan Act states that the "[h]uman rights protection provisions in the two Covenants have domestic legal status" (guoneifa de xiaoli). 83 Thus, not only do the Covenants have domestic legal status because of the civil law monist approach, but Taiwan has explicitly given these Covenants domestic legal status through the Taiwan Act.
C. Use of International Instruments as Aids in Interpreting the Constitutionality of National Legislation -A Judicial Point of View
As of January 14, 2012, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Constitutional Court) had rendered 695 Interpretations. 84 
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Constitutional Court began referring to international human rights laws in the 1990s, 85 and in total, the Court has referred to international treaties in seven majority opinions and eighteen separate opinions. 86 So far, Taiwan has taken a limited approach to incorporating international law into these interpretations; however, when the judges of the Constitutional Court have made reference to international instruments, their stance has been very strict.
87
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct require judges to stay "informed about relevant developments of international law, including international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms." 88 This principle is listed under Value 6, regarding competence. 89 This means knowledge of these international norms is necessary for a judge to be competent, but that a judge is not necessarily required to refer to such instruments. 90 But since the Constitutional Court began referring to international laws in the 1990s, judges in Taiwan have been living up to the international norms embodied in the Bangalore Principles and have been adopting the monist tradition of incorporating international law. 9 ' Importantly, the Constitutional Court has not only referenced international treaties in its opinions, it has also utilized these treaties to interpret the meaning of certain domestic legal concepts. 92 For instance, Interpretation 392 states, "In light of the abovementioned international conventions, it is obvious that the prosecutor shall not have the detention power enumerated in the Code of Criminal Procedure., 93 In Interpretation 549, the Justices similarly held that "an overall examination and arrangement, regarding the survivor allowance, insurance benefits and other relevant matters, should be conducted [Vol. 22:1 in accordance with the principles of this Interpretation, international labor conventions and the pension plan of the social security system. 9 4 Likewise, Interpretation 578 states, "The provisions of international labor conventions... shall also be taken into account." 95 Although the Constitutional Court has not used international instruments frequently, the instruments have clearly been given great deference, to the level of being heavily influential on the outcome of an interpretation. 96 Accordingly, reference to international treaties by the Taiwanese courts is perfectly congruent with the precepts of Taiwan's legal tradition. 9 7 By stating that "[h]uman rights protection provisions in the two Covenants have domestic legal status," Article 2 of the Taiwan Act simply reinforces the fact that these international instruments will be given equal or possibly higher normative status than ordinary national legislation.
98
To fulfill the Taiwan Act's desire to strengthen Taiwan's human rights protection system, the Judicial Yuan (the highest judicial organ of Taiwan), in addition to incorporating international instruments into court Interpretations, has drafted legislation to harmonize Taiwan laws with the Taiwan Act. 99 06 Elaborating on the theme of incorporating international legal norms into national legal systems, one commentator, George Slyz, notes that "[m]onism views international and national law as part of a single legal corpus, with the various national legal systems being derived from the broader framework provided by international law. 1 0 7 Therefore, within a monist framework, human rights norms are not only part of the Taiwanese legal order as local law, they may be superior to it. 108 In this regard, since "no theoretical barrier exists to applying international law," 1 0 9 the Taiwan Act would bind the Taiwanese Legislature to the requirements of the ICCPR and ICESCR in enacting legislation. 1° Furthermore, not only would the legislative and judicial branches.. be obliged to observe these human rights instruments, but presumably, the executive branch would be equally obliged to ensure the laws are carried out.
112
The dualist view, however, holds that domestic courts may incorporate or reject international elements as they see necessary.
1 3 Slyz notes that "a nation is responsible to other nations for carrying out mutual obligations, but each state determines the means and form by which it carries out its obligations."
Therefore, dualist states are usually required to change domestic law because international law applies by virtue of the domestic law's recognition and incorporation of such rules only. 1 15 The international law is thereby transformed into domestic law and avoids any question of supremacy. 1 6 Since Taiwan is of a civil law tradition, it should grant a higher normative status to human rights treaties like the ICCPR and ICESCR." 7 If there was any debate as to whether Taiwan utilizes the concepts of i]n practical terms, this means they have uncertain status in the world community which infects the population's day-to-day lives."" 9 The existence of this political purgatory and the special status that arises from its ambiguity will almost certainly influence a non-State actor's participation in a treaty, mainly because it not clear whether a non-State can be a "party." Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) defines "party" as "a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force.' 20 A plain reading of the VCLT indicates that a "party" must be a "State."' 2 ' With regard to whether an entity would be entitled "State" status, Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States provides, albeit somewhat oversimplified, that "[t]he state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. 122 Although Taiwan is not recognized as a State, it may meet the requirements to be considered a "State" for purposes of a treaty. 23 And since Taiwan has consented to be bound by the Covenants, it may be said that Taiwan is a kind of party to the Covenants, just not in the conventional sense.
124
The VCLT also states that a treaty is an "international agreement 
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concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." 1 25 Since Taiwan did not conclude the Covenants with other States, it cannot be said that the agreements, as recognized by Taiwan, are "treaties" in the traditional sense. But the VCLT goes on to say that .'ratification,' 'acceptance,' 'approval,' and 'accession' mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the internationalplane its consent to be bound by a treaty. 126 Taiwan no doubt has expressed, through the Taiwan Act, its desire to implement (shishi) the Covenants.1 27 Implementation is an expression of an international act and suggests Taiwan's willingness and consent to be bound by the Covenants on an international level. Furthermore, by declaring that "[a]ll laws, regulations, directions and administrative measures incompatible to the two Covenants should be amended within two years after the Act enters into force by new laws, law amendments, law abolitions and improved administrative measures," Taiwan accepts that domestic laws, regulations, directions, and administrative measures should be compatible with the Covenants and that it has consented to be bound domestically, and arguably internationally, by their provisions.128
A. Participant Discontent of the Exclusion of Parties
The biased nature of Covenant membership has narrowed the participation of certain parties, causing twelve Member States to each make declarations upon signature of the ICCPR and ICESCR. 29 In essence, these declarations recognize the discriminatory and limiting nature of Article 48 of the ICCPR and Article 26 of the ICESCR. 130 Although it did not sign the Covenants with other States parties, Taiwan should realize that by implementing the Covenants it is bound by their provisions and that it has opened itself up to international scrutiny. 137 Through both domestic and international scrutiny, Taiwan will have more types of human rights enforcement than would be possible with its domestic legislation alone. 1 38 As a non-State actor, Taiwan should be able to freely implement the Covenants into its domestic law, and at the same time, the international community should recognize and respect this implementation. 
2012]
B. Validating Alterations in Domestic Law through Human Rights Law Mechanisms
The Constitutional Court is charged with interpreting the Constitution of 147. See id. para. 7. "Article 2 requires that States Parties adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, educative and other appropriate measures in order to fulfill their legal obligations. The Committee believes that it is important to raise levels of awareness about the Covenant not only among public officials and State agents but also among the population at large." Id.
148. Taiwan Act, supra note 6, art. 8.
[Vol. 22:1 necessary measures "to give effect to the Covenant rights in the domestic order., 149 In this regard, both the judiciary and the legislature have given the green light to alter Taiwan's domestic law to achieve conformity with the Covenants.15 0
IV. STATE REPORTING PROCESS
The nine articles of the Taiwan Act no doubt were implemented to strengthen Taiwan's human rights protection system. 15 ' But a government's responsibilities towards its domestic population do not end with implementation alone; each State is required to engage in a comprehensive campaign to see that every Covenant obligation is addressed. 152 As such, it is crucial for States to have a correct and comprehensive understanding of the object and purpose of the Covenants as well as an accurate grasp of the scope and meaning of the obligations they create. 153 How the Covenant provisions can be implemented in the domestic legal system has proven to be an ongoing learning process for both Taiwan's government and its civil actors. 54 Through an initial reporting process, however, Taiwan may learn how to further implement and realize these human rights guarantees.
155 Implementation in the domestic legal system and the concurrent reporting process represent just the birth of the Covenants, which will continue far beyond the administration that initiated the process. Indeed, "[a]ll politicians face problems committing to their promises," so the policies of 149. General Comment No. 3 1, supra note 146, para. 13. "Article 2 allows a State Party to pursue this in accordance with its own domestic constitutional structure and accordingly does not require that the Covenant be directly applicable in the courts, by incorporation of the Covenant into national law. The Committee takes the view, however, that Covenant guarantees may receive enhanced protection in those States where the Covenant is automatically or through specific incorporation part of the domestic legal order." Id.
150. Although comment 31 only discusses the ICCPR, similar arguments may be made for the ICESCR.
151. Taiwan Act, supra note 6, art. 1 ("This Act is made.., to strengthen our country's human rights protection system."). 
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one politician must live beyond his or her term of office. 1 56 The domestic and international scrutiny that should result from Taiwan's implementation of the Covenant's will generate valuable performance information and engage domestic and international governance. This will create political consequences for politicians who do not live up to their promises, 1 5 7 and ultimately enhance the quality of human rights for current and future generations.
158
A. Motivations for the Implementation of the ICCPR and ICESCR into Domestic Law
Admittedly, there may be motivations for signing or implementing treaties into domestic law other than the mutual gain from cooperative activity." 9 Governments form treaties to achieve mutual gains from coordinated or cooperative activity at the international level. Without such gains, there is no reason for governments to enter into treaties. This approach[, however,] ignores the domestic sources of government policy and, thereby, underemphasizes the impact of domestic lobbying and the structure of the domestic political system in foreign affairs.
60
While international instruments indicate to the international community the positions of their ratifying parties, domestic lobbying and the influence on the domestic political system, with regard to domestic interactions, are also of importance. 16 ' This interest-group lobbying approach may be a more applicable way of viewing Taiwan's implementation of the Covenants because Taiwan's international interaction is limited.1 62 Ultimately, international commitments have three functions: (1) creating information by "utilizing international monitors, beyond the reach of any domestic politician, to generate neutral and valuable information on performance"; (2) creating costs for future violations; and (3) shifting decision-making authority to international actors. [Vol. 22:1
B. Reporting Obligations Under Article 40 of the ICCPR
Taiwan recognizes the importance of reporting the implementation status of the Covenants. This is evident in Article 6 of the Taiwan Act,' 64 which states, "The government should set up human rights reports system in accordance with the two Covenants.' '165 Articles of the ICCPR regarding reporting include Article 40:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights:
(a) Within one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the States Parties concerned; (b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so requests. can, and indeed should, serve to achieve a variety of objectives.
The first objective recognizes the importance of the initial report so as to "ensure that a comprehensive review is undertaken with respect to national legislation, administrative rules and procedures, and practices in an effort to ensure the fullest possible conformity with the Covenant. 175. Id. para. 2 ("Such a review might, for example, be undertaken in conjunction with each of the relevant national ministries or other authorities responsible for policy-making and implementation in the different fields covered by the Covenant.").
176. See supra Part V.B. 177. "The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit in conformity with this part of the Covenant reports on the measures which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized herein." ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 16(1). "All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies to the Economic and Social Council for consideration in accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant. Id. art. 16(2)(a). "The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall also transmit to the specialized agencies copies of the reports, or any relevant parts therefrom, from States Parties to the present Covenant which are also members of these specialized agencies in so far as these reports, or parts therefrom, relate to any matters which fall within the responsibilities of the said agencies in accordance with their constitutional instruments." Id. art. 16(2)(b).
178. See infra may be separate committees or combined into one; 84 one committee may be a more practical option, but the concluding observations will likely be more fruitful if the committees are separate.
D. ICCPR and ICESCR Reporting Process
Generally, State Reports are divided into two parts. 1 85 The first describes basic information about the reporting State, such as its land and people, general political structure, general legal framework within which human rights are protected, and information and publicity used to promote human rights awareness. 186 The second part describes measures the State has taken to implement the specific provisions of the Covenants and should, as a rule, address every relevant substantive article. 1 87 The remainder of this Note uses the terms "State Report" and "NGO report" when referring to the reporting process as it relates to the ICCPR.1 88 Although the specific reporting processes under the ICCPR and ICESCR are slightly different, these ICCPR concepts can easily be translated to the reporting requirements of the ICESCR. The report should be accompanied by copies of the principal legislative and other texts referred to in the report.19
The Human Rights Committee has emphasized that "[i]t is of critical importance that States ensure that they describe the factual situation, or, in other words, the practical realities regarding the implementation and enjoyment of Covenant rights, rather than limiting themselves to a description of the formal situation as represented in the State's laws and policies." 1 9 ' Of course, the legal norms should be described and elaborated, but the practical availability of remedies for violations of the ICCPR is equally important.
2
Taiwan will need to report its principal legislative measures as well as other non-legislative or judicial measures it has taken to ensure the enjoyment of Covenant rights. 193 In its Consolidated Guidelines for State Reports under the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee emphasizes that it is particularly important for a State party to explain how Article 2 of the Covenant is applied.1 94 Article 2 includes the following two provisions:
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Article 2 also includes the availability of remedies for violations of the ICCPR.1 96 Given the requirements set forth by the Human Rights Committee, Taiwan will need to address how its government will ensure to all individuals the rights recognized in the ICCPR, to what extent the laws or measures give effect to those rights, and what remedies are available for their violations. 
Response to the list of issues generated by the ad hoc committee
In the case of reporting under the ICESCR, a working group is established for each State. 198 This working group is "to identify in advance the questions that will constitute the principal focus of the dialogue with the representatives of the reporting States."' 199 The Human Rights Committee asks each State party to provide in writing its replies to the lists of issues, far enough in advance of the reporting session so as to enable the replies to be made available to the Committee. 200 These replies also should be timed so that NGOs will have a chance to comment on their content. the Covenant reporting process. The Human Rights Committee encourages NGOs to provide detailed, country-specific reports on States parties whose reports will be reviewed by the Committee°8 The Committee also invites NGOs to submit reports to the country task forces in charge of drafting the lists of issues. 20 9 Breakfast or lunchtime briefings are often organized for the members of the Human Rights Committee so that NGOs can have a personal dialogue with and provide current information to the members. 2'0 NGOs also are important once the concluding observations have been issued. concluding observations through media and other appropriate outlets. Therefore, at each step of the reporting process, it is important for NGOs to be actively involved in providing region-specific information. 213 Taiwan has a number of national NGOs with the capacity to provide detailed reports to the ad 214 hoc Human Rights Committee. These NGOs are capable of and should be pro-active in providing useful information in every aspect of the reporting process.
A. Consulting NGOs
As stated above, the Human Rights Committee welcomes NGO reports. 2 15 In the case of Taiwan, It is clear that NGOs and citizens have been pivotal in mediating international human rights and domestic constitutional/legal rights. In the course of their rights advocacies, they have taken commitments as well as responsibilities to make Taiwan into part of international human rights community and incorporating these international human rights laws firmly into the domestic legal soil. What these NGOs have built is not merely a domestic constitutional regime providing only domestic constitutional protections for individual rights. Rather, with their domestic/transnational natures of agency, they have built an intermediating transnational/constitutional regime where both international and domestic human rights laws meet with each other. 2t 6
The change has not been easy, but the following commitments by NGOs paved the way for greater progress in the area of human rights.
In the late 1980s NGOs began pushing for the enactment of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 217 These NGOs asked the government to formally recognize the CRC and to enact or revise domestic laws in accordance with its provisions. [T]he CRC has since occupied a prominent normative status regarding rights of the child. In all subsequent legal processes, whenever relevant laws were to be made or amended, the CRC has been always referred to and even served as a firm ground for such legal change. Even the Constitutional Court referred to it twice in constitutional interpretations related to children's rights. The increased involvement of NGOs in lobbying the Taiwanese government to ratify these agreements should continue under the Taiwan Act. 226 It is also highly important that Taiwanese NGOs be actively involved in providing relevant information regarding the Covenants. 22 It is therefore important that NGOs are involved in the follow-up process, not only to fulfill reporting obligations but also to inform the public of Covenant challenges.
The Special Rapporteur classifies the State follow-up information according to the following five categories: (1) "Largely satisfactory," (2) "Cooperative but incomplete," (3) "Recommendation(s) not implemented," (4) "Receipt acknowledged," or (5) "No response., 230 Basically, the Special Rapporteur should remain in contact with a State until the next periodic report is due, and that State's cooperation should be noted in the next concluding observations. 23 ' NGOs should also maintain contact with the State and Special Rapporteur so they may provide relevant information to the public. Communications between the Special Rapporteur and the States parties are published on the High Commissioner for Human Rights website, and it is important for NGOs to be aware of these communications and to transmit this information to the relevant authorities and media outlets. 232 The website contains country specific information as well as follow-up information for all States parties.233 Equally as important, Taiwan must be aware of the communications of the ad hoc Rapporteur in order to aid in appropriate lobbying of relevant governmental bodies. 34 The Government of Taiwan should maintain a similar website so that stakeholders may be aware of similarly relevant information.
Additionally, the UN Office in Geneva maintains a website that contains press releases and meeting summaries. 235 of different forms of social and legal systems. 25°F or Taiwan, this Note recommends that an ad hoc coalition of both international and domestic academics and NGOs convene to prepare a list of nominees for one or more ad hoc committees. This list, along with the curricula vitae of nominated parties, should then be voted on by the ad hoc coalition, resulting in around twenty members for each ad hoc committee.
Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee states that the "Committee shall elect from among its members a Chairperson, three Vice-Chairpersons and a Rapporteur." 251 These officers are normally elected for a term of two years, but this Note recommends that the ad hoc committee officers be elected for four years to account for the time it will take Taiwan to go from initial report to follow-up report. 2 The procedures also provide for Human Rights Committee appointed special rapporteurs. 253 These rapporteurs may have the specific function of communications under the Optional Protocols, which does not apply to Taiwan. 2 54 The third rapporteur is in charge of the follow-up to the Concluding Observations, which is crucial to the reporting process. 25 5 Ultimately, Taiwan's ad hoc committee should mirror as much as possible the composition of the Human Rights Committee and the CESCR.
A. Duty to Create and Importance of the Ad Hoc Committee(s)
The purpose of the meeting with the reporting State is to "establish a constructive dialogue between the Committee and the State Party." 256 The Human Rights Committee and the CESCR are neither judicial nor quasijudicial but are there to "assist States Parties in fulfilling their obligations under the Covenant, to make available to them the experience the committee has acquired in its examination of other reports and to discuss with them any issue related to the enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the Covenant., 257 The ad hoc committee too should exist to engage representatives in fruitful dialogue. 5 8 The Human Rights Committee has noted that its task is to "supervise and monitor the implementation of Covenant obligations by States parties. '' 259 Since the Committee is made up of actors from all over the world, there is no "single geographical or national perspective, the Committee speaks with a global voice., 260 Similarly, Taiwan should strive to have an ad hoc committee made up of international actors with specialties in human rights; 261 the intent being to mirror, as much as possible, the philosophy of the Human Rights Committee and the CESCR. 262 
B. Lessons from the CEDA WAd Hoc Committee
In Taiwan Further, an international symposium was organized with the aim of having independent experts examine the reports, much like if a state were to submit its report to the CEDAW in Geneva. 266 The three ex-CEDAW committee members
267
were invited to this symposium and published their findings. Taiwan should use a similar approach but should include more committee members. Taiwan pays a high level of respect to the human rights of its citizens, and making its laws conform to higher human rights standards is at the forefront of judicial activity. 271 The Constitutional Court notes that "[t]he maintenance of personal dignity and the protection of personal safety are contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and are also two of the fundamental concepts underlying [Taiwan's] constitutional protection of the people's freedoms and rights. 272 Referencing and incorporating international instruments in Taiwan is not a new concept. 273 In a single Interpretation, the Taiwan's domestic legal system. Since Taiwan is of a civil law tradition, it should grant at least an equal normative status to human rights treaties like the ICCPR and ICESCR. 277 There should be no "question of the supremacy of one system of law over the other" because each is "supreme in its own sphere.
order. 279 Since "no theoretical barrier exists to applying international law, ' 28°t he Taiwanese legislature, through the Taiwan Act, should be bound by the requirements of the ICCPR and ICESCR in enacting legislation. 281 The next four years are crucial for Taiwan to prove its commitment to the Covenants. The incorporation of the ICCPR and ICESCR into domestic law has provided Taiwan with an exciting opportunity to hold itself accountable for human rights issues and to realize further protections of human rights already enjoyed to a large extent by Taiwanese citizens.
28 2 This Note has legitimized Taiwan's domestic implementation of these international human rights instruments 283 and has given suggestions for proper reporting procedures under each Covenant's mandate. 284 Already, the commitments of Taiwan's Constitutional Court, legislature, NGOs, and stakeholders have been pivotal in imbedding international human rights norms into the domestic legal landscape. 285 The formation of ad hoc committee(s) in conjunction with other foreign experts can facilitate a fruitful and constructive dialogue between these actors so that the human rights situation in Taiwan may become even stronger. 286 The international community should, indeed must, respect this implementation and provide its honest scrutiny of the ongoing implementation of Covenant rights into Taiwanese domestic law. [Vol. 22:1
